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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Christine M. T. Pitts 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Educational Methodology, Policy, and Leadership 
 
June 2018 
 
Title: A Dynamic Network Study on How Consolidating State Governance Models 
Relates to Legislator Voting Patterns  
 
 In 2011, Oregon was one of many states in the U.S. consolidating their education 
governance around an early learning, K-12, and postsecondary hub. This study uses 
legislator-voting data to investigate the relationship between this consolidated model and 
endogenous policy formulation processes. This study employs a separable temporal 
exponential random graph model (STERGM) to investigate how an education governance 
shift toward consolidated authority relates to bipartisan outcomes for education-related 
bills over time. Oregon legislator voting networks were analyzed for cohesion, centrality, 
and community detection measures, as well as by legislator attributes (e.g. gender, party, 
and title) to test the association they had on the likelihood of forming ties with other 
legislators. Finally, to study the relationship of bipartisanship with legislators’ likelihood 
to vote commonly, I added the legislators’ political party attributes within dyads to 
analyze the association that having different political parties had on legislators’ common 
votes. The results highlight evidence of legislator networks that were very dense at each 
time point included in the study, with a high likelihood of forming ties. However, when 
Oregon shifted to centralized education governance model their legislator networks 
became more distributed and cohesive when compared to other years included in the 
longitudinal study. It is possible that such a shift prompted collaboration among 
 v 
legislators resulting in mutuality that increased the likelihood for underrepresented 
groups of legislators (e.g. females and republicans) to vote commonly with their 
colleagues. Aligned with previous research, this study found that centralized governing 
bodies reinforced by political legislation provided collaborative initiatives for the 
legislative community. Attending to bipartisan voting patterns dynamically through a 
governance shift is a valuable investigation that will provide nuanced inferences about 
education governance and policymaking for states making similar consolidated 
governance shifts in the future.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Politicians and policymakers use education governance institutions like state 
boards, departments of education, and legislatures to influence education governance. 
State-level changes to education governance and policy result in shifting power and 
capital between the legislature, chief of education, and local administrators. Prior to 2011, 
Oregon’s education governance departments were locally controlled and decentralized. 
For example, education policymakers representing different levels of power (e.g., the 
governor, superintendent of public instruction, and deputy superintendent) and different 
substantive areas (e.g., post-secondary, PK-12, and early learning governing bodies) 
across state departments were isolated by their organizational structure. After 2011, the 
Oregon Education Investment Board (OEIB) was introduced in order to restructure the 
state governance systems and create a centrally aligned vision and strategic plan. 
However, it remains unclear to what extent the OEIB was associated with achieving 
education goals set by the state legislature. The current study investigates how the OEIB 
and their related policy agenda changed Oregon’s education policymakers’ voting 
patterns, a proxy for education goals.  
Prior to Senate Bill 909, which enacted the OEIB in 2011, the state superintendent 
of public instruction and the state board of education served as the two education policy 
advisors to Oregon’s governor. Senate Bill 909 (2011) established that the governor now 
served as the state superintendent of public instruction whose role is to oversee the 
existing state department of education, as well as the newly created departments 
including (a) the Oregon Education Investment Board, (b) the Higher Education 
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Coordinating Commission, and the (c) Early Learning Division. With the enactment of 
the OEIB, the appointed Chief Education Officer became a new leading voice for the 
education policymaking community in Oregon. The Chief Education Officer and the 
OEIB were required to publish annual legislative reports to provide the legislative 
assembly direction and guidance. When the governor established the OEIB in Senate Bill 
909, they were charged to “oversee a unified public education system that begins with 
early childhood services and continues throughout public education from kindergarten to 
post-secondary education” (Senate Bill 909, 2011, § 1). The bill required the OEIB to 
consist of the elected governor, twelve members appointed by the governor, an appointed 
member from each congressional district, and the Chief Education Officer. This shift 
centralized many disparate departments within the state department of education 
previously overseen by an appointed state superintendent of public instruction.  
State education agencies function as education governance networks (e.g. the 
superintendent of public instruction, assistant superintendents, administrators, and 
analysts) whose roles are to build social, economic, and intellectual capital and improve 
effectiveness for policy setting and implementation. State legislators inform the political 
decision-making driven by the discourse of education policy advocates and public 
managers at state education agencies. The OEIB was intended to consolidate the 
distributed power from local policymakers toward a centralized education governance 
model in Oregon. The OEIB was charged with providing legislative proposals during 
each legislative session in order to centralize a policy agenda across the governance 
structure and inform the policy formulation process. The study presented here focused on 
the extent to which the OEIB shifted power among Oregon senators and representatives 
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by measuring longitudinal legislative support for enrolled bills using co-voting patterns 
among the legislative assembly as an indicator of the OEIB’s association with policy 
formulation.  
A Network Theory of Education Governance 
The following literature review synthesizes two perspectives on organizations and 
individuals in the context of education governance. Brewer and Smith’s (2008) three 
sequential frames of (a) what, (b) who, and (c) how are summarized in Table 1 and 
provide a basic format for understanding the mechanisms and functions of educational 
governance models. Network theory extends the traditional perspectives of governance in 
that it maps the organizations and individuals that constitute education governance 
structures. Network theory builds upon Brewer and Smith’s (2008) governance 
dimensions by adding a dynamic layer about how the functions, institutions, and 
mechanisms in their sequential frames relate to one another within governance models. 
This systematic literature review included literature from the areas of education 
governance networks, legislation and social capital, and legislative voting. Brewer and 
Smith’s (2008) framework with network theory uses three broad categories of education 
governance networks: (a) the functions and goals, (b) central agencies and key actors, and 
(c) mechanisms for policymaking as a framework to organize themes spanning these 
literatures. 
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Table 1 
Brewer and Smith’s (2008) Three Sequential Educational Governance Dimensions 
1. What What are the goals of the system in terms of? 
(a) Structure and organization  
(b) Finance and business  
(c) Human resources/personnel 
(d) Educational programming 
2. Who Who is best situated to carry out the tasks necessary to meet those goals? 
(a) Governor 
(b) Legislature 
(c) State board of education  
(d) State superintendent  
(e) State department of education  
(f) District superintendents  
(g) Regional education districts 
(h) Principals or teachers 
3. How How should these actors best induce other to implement policy?  
(a) Mandates 
(b) Inducements  
(c) Capacity building  
(d) System changes 
 
The What, Who, and How, of Education Governance and Policy Formation 
Education governance reflects the interactions between school systems, politics, 
and the community (Brewer and Smith, 2008). Brewer and Smith (2008) use three 
dimensions that follow a sequential order for describing education governance structures 
at the state level. The first dimension represents the “what,” or the functions required of 
the organization. The second dimension represents the “who,” or the actors, stakeholders, 
and institutions needed to fulfill the functions. The third dimension represents the “how,” 
or the mechanisms necessary to complete the functions of the organization. Generally, 
state education governance systems are complex and involve interrelated stakeholders 
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like regional centers, parents and guardians, and non-profit organizations, as well as the 
nuanced interactions of each group that influence the education system and quality of 
students’ schooling (Manna and McGuinn, 2013).  
In this study, Brewer and Smith’s (2008) guiding questions frame the OEIB’s 
potential association with the three dimensions of education governance. To extend on 
the what, who, and how dimensions (Brewer and Smith, 2008), I apply a network theory 
approach that operationalizes how actors form complex networks at both the legislative 
and organizational level and shape educational governance structures and policymaking. 
A theoretical understanding of networks advances Brewer and Smith’s (2008) 
contribution and offers new ways of thinking about education governance structures 
change legislation outcomes across party lines.  
State education governance in the United States. There is a myriad of formal 
education governance arrangements that affect how education policy is developed and 
implemented in the U.S. Among all 50 states, the degree to which state education 
governance systems are run by (a) local or state control, (b) participatory or restricted 
public input, and (c) distributed or consolidated authority determines their complex 
functions and how they inform education policymaking (Smith & Gasparian, 2017). 
Local or state control is determined by comparing the authority of the state education 
agency with that of the school districts over substantive decision-making areas, like 
curriculum adoption, teacher evaluation systems, and chronically underperforming 
schools (Zeehandler et al., 2015). The degree of public participation and input in 
education governance reflects whether voters and diverse stakeholders determine state 
leaders over existing authority (such as the governor or special interest groups). Whether 
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a state uses distributed or consolidated authority is determined by the presence of 
separate education boards, independent accountability offices, or the lack of a P-20 
education system. This investigation will focus on how Oregon transitioned from a 
distributed to a consolidated state education governance system. 
 Oregon’s authority structure has transformed from a distributed to consolidated 
governance model over the last decade. Prior to the enactment of the OEIB in 2011, the 
superintendent of public instruction and the state board of education were the leading 
advisors to the governor. On the left of Figure 1, the governor appointed the members of 
the state board of education and the chief state school officer (i.e. the superintendent of 
public instruction) was elected (Fulton, 2008). On the right of Figure 1, the Oregon 
Department of Education organization chart illustrates this hierarchical government 
model. The organization chart depicts how the superintendent of public instruction 
oversaw the state board and the deputy superintendent’s offices, like school 
improvement, teaching and learning, and assessment prior to 2011. However, at this time 
the offices of early learning, higher education, and youth development services were 
isolated from the education governance. 
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Figure 1. Illustrations of Oregon’s education governance model prior to 2011 when the OEIB was enacted (left) and Oregon 
Department of Education’s organizational chart (right).   
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A state governance intervention: The Oregon Education Investment Board. 
According to the Education Commission of the States, there was a large movement 
among state education agencies to shift power over education policymaking to governors 
in 2011 (Zinth, 2011). Oregon uniquely implemented this shift by (a) enacting the 
Oregon Education Investment Board and (b) becoming the only state to put the governor 
at the helm of education governance as the chief state school officer or superintendent of 
public instruction (Zinth, 2011). Figure 2 illustrates how legislative changes during 2011 
consolidated authority in Oregon’s education governance model with the governor. 
Compared to the education governance system from 2008, depicted in Figure 1, Figure 2 
displays how state offices moved from distributed and isolated positions within the 
governance model to a centralized structure overseen universally by the governor. I 
propose that this shift of authority functioned as a state education governance 
intervention. This shift changed Oregon’s state education governance system in the 
following ways: (a) legislation deemed the governor the superintendent of public 
instruction, (b) the governor, not the public, appointed the state board education, a deputy 
superintendent of public instruction, and a chief education officer (who led the Oregon 
Education Investment Board), and (c) under Senate Bill 909 (2011) the governor now 
oversaw the newly enacted Oregon Education Investment Board, and (d) the early 
learning, higher education, and youth development offices were now housed within the 
Oregon Department of Education and overseen by the governor as well.  
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Figure 2. Illustrations of Oregon’s education governance model after 2011 when the OEIB was enacted (left) and Oregon Department 
of Education’s organizational chart (right).   
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With the enactment of the OEIB, the appointed Chief Education Officer became a 
new authority over education policymaking. In particular, the OEIB was charged with 
designing a cohesive public education system from early childhood into post-secondary 
education by developing and overseeing an early-learning council. To achieve this, the 
OEIB was also required to merge the state boards of education and higher education “by 
transferring the duties of those boards and the State Commission on Children and 
Families to the Oregon Education Investment Board,” (Senate Bill 909, 2011, p. 4). 
Finally, the OIEB was to write a legislative report to the committee on education within 
the first six months on “proposed legislative measures” (Senate Bill 909, 2011, p. 4). 
Ultimately, Senate Bill 909 (2011) framed the OEIB’s goals, scope, and work within the 
context of consolidating education governance authority in Oregon and informing 
legislative outcomes for the broad goal of a unified P-20 education system.  
The Role of Social Networks in Education Governance  
In the 21st century, education governance shifted from hierarchical bureaucracies 
toward public, private, and non-profit networks (Russell, Meredith, Childs, Stein, & 
Prine, 2015; Meier & O’Toole, 2006; Manna, 2012). Today, these public policy 
governance networks respond to complex social problems facing communities and 
crosscutting mandates (O’Toole & Meier, 1999). Recent educational governance network 
studies range from within-building analyses (Daly & Finnigan, 2011), to state-level 
policy implementation (Russell et al., 2015), to philanthropy driven reform (Au & 
Ferrare, 2014). These studies focus on policy implementation to illustrate the shift of 
education governance from a funder/auditor role toward a substantive decision-maker 
role (Mana, 2012). However, there remains a dearth of research on education governance 
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networks’ ties to policy formulation, especially on the networked governance approaches 
(Au & Ferrare, 2014).  
Political scientists are now using social networks to understand the capacity of 
stakeholders in the public policy sector (Rogowski, Sinclair, & Beck, 2012). Legislative 
scholars are employing networks to understand the dynamics of legislator influence on 
voting patterns (Alvarez & Sinclair, 2011; Rogowski et al., 2012). Yet, few legislative 
studies analyze how exogenous institutions relate to endogenous legislative processes 
(Alvarez & Sinclair, 2011). The current study investigates how an exogenous education 
policy intervention (i.e. the OEIB) related to bipartisan voting in the legislator network. 
To extend upon the existing education governance network research centering on policy 
implementation, this study intends to analyze state legislator networks for patterns of 
association on education-related bills at the policy formulation stage.   
Policy formulation begins with a written legislative proposal, which, if supported, 
evolves into official legal language as a bill, then as a statute, and finally as an official 
policy (Fowler, 2013). The OEIB was charged with providing legislative proposals to the 
legislators during each session. While many legislative proposals derive from a single 
stakeholder group (e.g. chief executives, administrative agencies, or interest groups; 
Fowler, 2013), the OEIB provided their legislative proposals for the interests of a variety 
of stakeholders due to their organizational structure (e.g. governor, Chief Education 
Officer, and the board members). In some states, it is common for a coalition of actors to 
propose legislation, which ensures that the proposal enters the policymaking process with 
broad support (Fowler, 2013). In Oregon, the OEIB was designed so that the centralized 
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governance structure provided a policy formulation process that spanned stakeholder 
groups in this way. 
The functions of education governance networks. The study of networks 
focuses on at least two layers of governance: (a) the individual level (i.e., human actors) 
or (b) the organizational level (i.e., an organization as a whole). This review of education 
governance networks literature delineated two goals for individual actors within 
networks: (a) social cohesion and (b) social capital. Data from the literature on education 
governance networks also revealed two goals for overall networks: (a) network capacity 
and (b) network effectiveness. These four characteristics identify the goals of public 
managers as individuals within an evolving education governance network by applying a 
unique dynamic layer of functions.  
Social cohesion. Social cohesion is a cornerstone of stability across social 
systems like economy, education, and governance. Within these areas of public policy, 
social cohesion can be conceived as the “relational togetherness of a group” or the “sense 
of togetherness that people express” (Moody & White, 2003, p.5). State education 
agencies play an essential role promoting social cohesion through ideation and social 
interactions (Woolman & Fleisch, 2008; Moody & White, 2003). State education 
agencies with a uniquely Democratic nature can become the cohesive group or central 
agency connecting constituents across external organizations. These collaborative 
governance networks offer incentives for cooperation, create forums for dialogue across 
multi-agency driven initiatives, and design and provide models for reflection and 
accountability. However, central agencies face pressure to adhere to traditional models of 
hierarchical government (Innes, Booher, & Di Vittorio, 2010; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). 
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Regardless of their theoretical role in creating social cohesion, state institutions’ 
practical contribution may not always provide a useful scaffold. For many social service 
managers in our country, governing institutions remain an obstacle to collaborative 
practices (Innes et al., 2010). For example, the U.S. Constitution sought to maintain 
barriers to cohesion to protect minority rights from the power of momentary majorities by 
vetting popular preferences across representative institutions (McLendon & Eddings, 
2002). For example, state legislatures introduced over 9,000 measures related to 
protecting immigrant rights between 2005 and 2012 and over 1,300 were enacted 
(Nienhusser, 2015). Yet, today educational progressives see current politics as misaligned 
with the broader social goal to benefit students’ lifelong success. Educational 
progressives currently seek an instructional framework, like networked governance, that 
provides a lesser role for politicians, parochial neighborhood interests, and self-interested 
parents (Cibulka, 2001). 
Researchers suggest that attaining systemic cohesion and goals requires districts 
and schools to practice shared sensemaking and transparent relationships around 
education reform (Daly & Finnigan, 2012). These inter-organizational relationships must 
overcome the negative effect of federal sanctions flooding state education agencies and 
trickling down to districts and schools. Specifically, an evidenced pattern of institutional 
change at the state, where actors from internal and external government agencies create 
new networks to deal with the complexities of education reform, can bridge interstitial 
spaces that lack the public’s confidence and conflicting mandates (Innes et al., 2010). 
Daly and Finnigan (2012) explain that, in education, ties exist more often between like 
groups (e.g., intra school or intra central office) and less often across groups (e.g., 
 14 
between buildings and district offices), but when districts initiated a tie it was more likely 
reciprocated than when schools initiated a tie. Evidence suggests that patriarchal 
relationships between hierarchical layers discourage horizontal bonds between peers 
(Leonard et al., 2010). This model assumes that state education agencies can achieve the 
goals of social cohesion easier than districts or buildings.  
Social capital. Actors within education governance networks build social capital, 
or their collective resources embedded within the network (Lin & Erickson, 2010).  
Russell et al. (2015) operationalize a state education agency’s capital as their capacity 
using these resources to strategically enact policy. Democratic SEAs develop this capital 
through Fowler’s (2013) Educational Policy Planning and Research Centers (EPPRCs), 
large state policy networks with cross-sector relationships. For example, Race to the Top 
plans emphasized collaborative work across a range of stakeholders, like universities, 
community partners, and public-sector industries (Russell et al., 2015). In these 
integrated networks social capital develops through informal social interactions, norm 
setting, trust building, and participation toward shared objectives (Forbes, 2006). 
Networked agencies working on education policy can stop cycles of negative social 
outcomes by developing social capital built from relevant and diverse discourse across 
heterogeneous individuals (Marshall, 2002). 
Education policy networks achieve diverse networks through social inclusion 
using strategies acceptable across participants. Network norms and social connection 
reify their commitment to common efforts in spite of adversity (Marshall, 2002). 
Marshall (2002) found that across local, state, and federal policy levels teacher unions 
were a central agency that linked two levels of activists: (a) the locally driven activists 
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and (b) the macro policy actors. This social network developed capital and political 
pressure, driving the design of a gender equity policy (Marshall, 2002). In hierarchical 
networks across levels of actors, reciprocity, cooperation, and toleration are norms that 
ground relationships (Forbes, 2006).  
Actors in a hierarchical network are embedded or nested in their social structure. 
Social embeddedness illustrates how dyadic relationships that extend beyond two actors’ 
result in a sequence of changes, where behaviors or outcomes of an actor from the lower 
level will result in effects with actors at higher levels of an institutional hierarchy 
(Leonard et al., 2010). Leonard et al. (2010) describe how families, clans, castes, or 
religious communities are common social systems that represent social embeddedness. In 
these networks, actors embedded in lower levels of hierarchical relationships, like the 
poor, young, or old, usually benefit from providing services or loyalty to the more 
advantaged actors in the social network (Leonard et al., 2010). These vertical ties take the 
place of horizontal ties between actors within the same level and ensure lower level 
actors from potential social risk (Leonard et al., 2010).  
Network Capacity. Network capacity refers to the aggregated social cohesion and 
capital across actors within a network. Russell et al. (2015) explain that capacity is 
determined by actors’ structural placement within a network and their individual 
resources. Network capacity can be developed through mutual understanding and shared 
knowledge that informs policy-setting agendas at state education agencies (Innes et al., 
2010). These are the cores of a cultural shift from an organization’s discrete hierarchical 
governance model to a networked model built on social cohesion. Innes et al. (2010) 
describe an adapting metropolitan megaregion promoted by a planning institution of 
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advocates, technical experts, and skilled facilitators. Such a large networked governance 
shift occurred through institutional change from the inside out by creating new 
governance practices to deal with the complexity of the work (Innes et al., 2010). In 
effect, social cohesion is the outcome of mutual persuasion across social institutions 
(Knoke, 1990).  
One critique of local and private education governance is its closed and narrow 
nature (Cibulka, 2001). Rooted in American culture, local and private networks in control 
of education inhibit their own performance by limiting the flow of novel information and 
restraining responsiveness (Cibulka, 2001; Daly & Finnigan, 2012). Cibulka (2001) 
explained that conflict across actors moving into local school politics is often 
“constrained by incentives for compromise and accommodation,” (p. 6). Yet, social 
capital drives a networked governance model where (a) a small group of actors dominates 
the development of one particular policy arena, (b) policymaking includes bargaining and 
agreements, and (c) the networked arrangements overcome partisan politics (Berry & 
Berry, 1989).  
Network effectiveness. Network effectiveness refers to the way that social 
networks implement the components of network capacity (e.g. social cohesion and 
capital) to benefit the population of interest. In education governance networks, sub-
governments are useful for organizing social capital and implementing new practices that 
benefit public policy (Hannah, 1996). The views of bureaucrats who claim to speak for 
the public represent public policy reform, but institutional capacity at state and local 
leadership levels determines how education reform is implemented (Fowler, Heaney, 
Nickerson, Padgett, & Sinclair, 2011). The governmental systems in our nation are 
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designed to slow large shifts of power across government to protect public interest 
(Cibulka, 2001). Today, private organizations like think tanks, special interest groups, 
and non-profit agencies are diverse players in education policy who’ve developed a 
renewed interest in macropolitics in our society (Cibulka, 2001). However, since 
education governance is a local affair, public policy actors’ behaviors and interests are 
predictable and often constrained by compromise with local leaders (Cibulka, 2001).  
The interests and capacity of private sector partners drive public-private 
partnerships (Jones & Bird, 2000) and the extension of state government complicates 
their goals (Russell et al., 2015). When working with private sector partners, state 
education agencies require strategies to maintain their participation to achieve reform 
goals (Russell et al., 2012). For example, Russell et al. (2015) explain that for state-level 
Race to the Top networks state education agencies maintained mutual understanding by 
narrowing their focus toward the singular task of synthesizing knowledge-based 
resources. More systematic coherence across network efforts stems from mutual 
sensemaking about a specific topic of interest (Daly & Finnigan, 2012). The interactions 
of variables within governance networks and the causality of their non-linear functions 
are not well documented in the literature (O’Toole & Meier, 1999).  
Traditionally, education governance relies on formal institutions and relationships 
among people across agencies to shape practice, policy, and innovation (Robertson & 
Dale, 2013). Daly and Finnigan (2012) explain that sanctions from higher levels of 
government affect professional collaboration negatively, but more laterally connected 
systems across institutions achieve organizational change and information sharing. 
Studies of patriarchal relationships in social settings find that patronage and hierarchy 
 18 
discourage the relationships necessary to build networks between peers, and there is 
pressure to align with the traditional social exchange network to fortify social health in 
communities (Leonard et al., 2010). Collaborative networks overcome institutional 
hierarchies by developing capital across diverse participants, participant interaction, and 
mutual persuasion (Innes et al., 2010).  
Central actors in education governance networks. O’Toole and Meier (1999) 
refer to the structure of hierarchies and networks as the “formal authority to compel” 
within a public agency (p. 508). Relationships across networks of public agencies are 
fluid in order to adapt to changing initiatives. The literature describes how legislative 
committees use (a) broad macro-political arenas central to education governance 
networks and (b) public managers informing the policy agenda. Differences in the 
distribution of authority are unique to the contexts within different education governance 
networks (Brewer & Smith, 2008). For education governance initiatives, networks’ 
authority resides mostly with states to make policy-related decisions.  
 Macropolitical arenas. Complex education politics in America involves various 
sub-governments composed of public interest groups and a few macro-political actors 
(Cibulka, 2001). The macro-political actors influence issue-networks based on their 
interests and power (Hannah, 1996). In the past, education reform was driven by state-
level actors like governors and legislators, but today education reform reflects a 
macropolitical discussion shaped by problem-solution discourse from education policy 
advocates (Cibulka, 2001). Specifically, an emergence in think tanks has strengthened the 
relevance of macropolitical concepts of educational policy for American society, local 
activists, and alternative actors of power (i.e. entrepreneurs and non-profit and private 
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organizations; Cibulka, 2001). For example, Au and Ferrare (2014), found that 
interrelated forms of sponsorship were powerful vehicles for passing charter school 
reform legislation in Washington. Unfortunately, this model of policymaking acts in the 
interest of a privileged few at the exclusion of interests affecting broader populations 
with less power (Hannah, 1996). In this case, horizontal ties are necessary to shift 
networks that are currently structured through strong vertical ties and do not represent the 
interests of the broader population (Hannah, 1996).  
Sub-government models operationalize interest-based education policymaking 
and exclude public interests that do not align with the narrowly focused ends of exclusive 
populations (Cibulka, 2001). Current trends in educational progressivism deny the value 
and security of vertical ties because they view political actors, typically considered 
powerful at higher levels of institutional networks, so poorly (Cibulka, 2001). Cibulka 
(2001) explains that these progressive networks seek an institutional framework that 
departs from corrupt politicians and self-interested wealthy families. Progressive 
networks’ horizontal ties aim to stabilize and reify their substantive stance through 
carefully selected vertical ties with actors like entrepreneurs, private organizations, and 
non-profit agencies that align with their norms and goals. This macropolitical network 
structure informs their ability to absorb information and build trust among a community 
(Daly & Finnigan, 2012).  
Public managers. Education is a domain that is reserved implicitly to the states 
by the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Fowler, 2013). For many generations, 
states gave up their power to the local authorities and those authorities are very powerful 
when determining how factors in districts, schools, and classrooms operate. But, since the 
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1970s, states have been taking back their constitutional authority over education policy. 
Additionally, the federal mandates magnify the state role in educational policy (Manna, 
2012). For this reason, state-level policy actors are more important than federal or local 
ones because states have returned as the major constitutional authority over public 
education since the 1970s (Fowler, 2013).  
Media and political textbooks focus on policymaking at the federal level, so state 
level policy is often less understood and studied (Fowler, 2013). In order to move 
researcher’s and policymaker’s thinking forward beyond descriptive research of macro-
level policy stages, I aimed to identify the power of public managers within an evolving 
state governance structure in the 21st century. According to Alvarez and Sinclair (2011), 
research on legislative behavior in the past has focused on internal “institutions,” yet 
exogenous institutions that guide the legislative agenda and action are less rigorously 
investigated. The goal of this study is to leverage network theory to understand how 
nuanced interactions between bureaucracies, actors, and environmental factors might 
change legislative behavior.  
The mechanisms of education governance networks. There is tension between 
the bureaucratic and networked institutions in the modern public sector. The literature 
describes how (a) sociological characteristics, (b) power roles, and (c) stabilizing 
features are mechanisms for change toward polycentric institutions that include many 
centers of decision making (Janssens & Ehren, 2016). In response to these changing 
factors, many resources and expenditures now fall between public and private sectors 
(Peters, 2010). Quasi-public organizations increased during the post-war era in most 
countries (Peters, 2010). O’Toole and Meier (1999) describe the increasing presence of 
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multi-organizational networks of agencies within the public administration field. They 
explain that networks provide stabilizing factors like prevention for social problems 
facing communities, crosscutting mandates, and public-private partnerships (O’Toole and 
Meier, 1999). Networked governance approaches work to stabilize social initiatives by 
providing institutional support for some sociological needs and destabilizing 
traditionally- based hierarchical structures that reify dominant power roles.  
Sociological characteristics. Social networks lend themselves to analyses that 
identify how powerful groups of people are destabilized to empower disadvantaged 
groups. The social networks are designed to change social outcomes, which are driven by 
dominant discourses and non-dominant needs (Timm, 2014). In a qualitative study, Timm 
(2014) explored how Community Based Organizations, a central agency for school-
community partnerships, liberated families in poverty by validating their non-dominant 
discourse through public speaking and formal partnerships. Yet, trends in communities 
are created by the dominant discourses that reify injustice and disadvantage (Timm, 
2014). The bureaucratic Democracy creates obstacles to intuitive policy because public 
managers, not communities, are the beneficiaries of the policy yields (Jones & Bird, 
2000).  
Bureaucracy exists for tradition and stabilization, but recent education policy 
initiatives that span traditional institutions destabilize the bureaucracy. Chappelle (2006) 
suggests that the power and social class of those who dominate education policy 
discourse and the ideological state control of education policy are related. In education 
policy, those who define what education is and how it is implemented in a state rarely 
address the plurality of the context of children’s experiences across the state (Chappelle, 
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2006). Recent South African legislation embedded school governing boards to strengthen 
political rights for local interests; instead, the boards’ authority reproduced existing 
patterns of inequality (Woolman & Fleisch, 2008). Across sectors and agencies, policy-
related decisions are made at varying scales without community collaboration for those 
affected and with no goal to achieve common agreements or social outcomes (Innes et al., 
2010).   
Social networks allow internal and external government actors to define new 
governance practices in response to emerging community needs (Innes et al., 2010). 
These connections potentially fill the interstitial spaces where government lacks formal 
authority or informal knowledge of contextual factors (Innes et al., 2010). Nienhusser 
(2015) describes how the policymaking environment, processes, and political forces 
shaped New York’s policy-setting agenda for undocumented immigrants’ postsecondary 
education. Policymaking efforts that affected undocumented immigrants in New York 
existed at federal, state, and local levels that worked in tandem, but did not operationalize 
a formal structure, agenda, or task list (Innes et al., 2010). Ultimately, social networks 
exist within governmental institutions by leading regional initiatives representing locally 
driven social initiatives. 
Public interests are usually served through institutional efforts (e.g. the 
presidency, political party, or national government; Cibulka, 2001). National government 
efforts, like national surveys, often depict citizens apart from their social contexts as 
though they are a homogeneous group of unrelated people (Knoke, 1990). Progressive 
education movements argue that education policy today threatens the Democratic state 
because public interest groups control education policymaking without an understanding 
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of the embedded social outcomes (Cibulka, 2001). This belief illustrates how public 
education policy may need to be reconciled with public interest (Cibulka, 2001). These 
tensions between large and small political framings create a friction that disrupts 
powerful hierarchies. 
Power. The power of state legislators is shaped by social characteristics of 
governance attributes, social, and intellectual capital (Renzulli & Roscigno, 2005). 
Politicians analyzing and designing policy must consider both the formulation and 
implementation phases across these levels and discrete turning points (Renzulli & 
Roscigno, 2005). For example, Nienhusser (2015) reported that an influential 
policymaker explained that bills were sometimes strategically introduced later in the 
legislative session when legislators were overwhelmed and unable to attend to the 
priorities of each bill. In this way, state legislatures fail to uphold the goals of the U.S. 
Constitution that aimed to destabilize destructive majorities, especially for the purpose of 
protecting minority rights (McLendon & Eddings, 2002). This gap within the governance 
structure makes way for one of two possible scenarios, (a) the introduction of a multi-
sector network representing diverse facets of public interests or (b) increased power for 
actors and groups who have already defined the dominant discourse.  
The intergovernmental system in the United States was designed to resist a rapid 
increase in power for any single group (Cibulka, 2001). In order to stall rather than 
facilitate power, government systems were created to stop majority groups. In reality, the 
tension between sub-groups in government reified the distribution of power through 
common discourse existing within bureaucracy (Cibulka, 2001; Timm, 2014). Today, 
education policy gains and uses social capital through sub-governmental networks 
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playing in the larger policy arena (Hannah, 1996). Legislators have the obligation to 
question the sub-governments’ organizational goals, community support systems, and 
alignment of discourse with dominant or non-dominant populations (Timm, 2014).  
Although our forefathers attempted to align the national agenda with multifaceted public 
interest, the tension that they created, which was intended to protect minority rights, 
actually enforces the opposite (Cibulka, 2001). 
Stabilizing features. The public policy literature agrees that structure, common 
agendas, and explicit tasks emerge from newly born processes set in motion by policy 
networks that span federal and state leaders (Innes et al., 2010). Specifically, self-
governing practices and social Democracy principles stabilize networks aimed at 
destabilizing traditional hierarchical institutions (Woolman & Fleish, 2008). In the South 
African Schools Act, representative school governing bodies used social Democracy 
systems to stabilize political participation across language divides (Woolman & Fleish, 
2008). In addition, the school governing bodies were reinforced by the macro-political 
legislation and filled the gap of government through collaborative regional initiatives 
(Innes et al., 2010; Woolman & Fleish, 2008). The literature agrees that common 
agreements that explicitly describe broad objectives and participation norms in networks 
achieve stabilizing outcomes for commonly ignored facets of public interest. 
The Case of Oregon: A Movement towards Consolidated State Governance  
The Education Commission of the States identifies four models of education 
governance in the U.S. based on how state boards of education are constituted and 
whether the chief state school officer is elected or appointed (Fulton, 2008). In 2011, the 
Education Commission of the States illustrated a shift in state education governance 
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structures aligning with “legislation or gubernatorial actions [that gave] … governors a 
greater role in education policymaking” (Zinth, 2011, p. 1). Eight states were reported to 
have proposed changes, like amending state board membership and duties and 
consolidating the governance or administration structures (Zinth, 2011). Among the 
eight, Oregon was included for (a) legislation that named the governor the superintendent 
of education and (b) “an executive order issued in February 2011 by Oregon Governor 
Kitzhaber [that] puts the governor at the helm of a group to develop consolidated finance 
mechanisms for all publicly funded education in the state” (Zinth, 2011, p. 2). Later that 
year, during the legislative session, the executive order would be formally voted into state 
law and the “groundbreaking budget and policy framework”, the Oregon Education 
Investment Board, would be charged with (a) unifying a P-20 education system, (b) 
integrating early childhood and family services, and (c) consolidating state level 
responsibilities for public education (Zinth, 2011, p. 2).   
Multistage intervention. This study treats the introduction of the OEIB in 
Oregon as a multistage “intervention” variable. The OEIB was charged with writing 
legislative proposals during each legislative session. The Oregon legislature meets for 
regular sessions in odd-numbered years, so this study uses voting data from Oregon 
legislators during the regular sessions in 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. Table 2 
depicts a descriptive overview of the research design where data for 2009 serves as 
evidence of pre-intervention voting patterns, data for 2011 serve as an interruption when 
SB 909 was passed, and data for 2013, 2015, and 2017 represents the post-intervention 
voting patterns. Given the enactment of the OEIB in 2011, it is highly likely that any 
changes to voting patterns were delayed until 2013.  
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At each time point representing a regular legislative session, the intervention 
evolved by incorporating a new organization and charge with regard to the governance 
model of the OEIB. Table 2 illustrates the evolution of the intervention at each time 
point. This study includes one pre-intervention time point, the legislative session in 2009, 
to explore legislator network characteristics prior the enactment of the OEIB. The 
following time points under study are described in detail in the following sections.  
Table 2 
Descriptive Summary of OEIB as a Multistage Intervention  
Phase Core Features 
Pre – OEIB 
(2009) 
NA 
Creation 
(2011) 
Chief Education Officer Rudy Crew 
Created Oregon Education Investment Fund to,  
(a) oversee cradle to career initiative (40-40-20 
vision) 
(b) recommend strategic investments  
(c) develop the Early Learning Council 
(d) develop Higher Education Coordinating 
Commission 
(e) create longitudinal student data system 
(f) provide legislation recommendations 
Implementation 
(2013) 
Nancy Golden, appointed Chief Education Officer 
Strategic investments disseminated 
Technical support for achievement compacts and networks 
Early Learning Council formed 
Higher Education Coordinating Commission formed 
Research department created for,   
(a) designing longitudinal student-database 
(b) studying legislative policy initiatives 
(c) technical support for strategic investments 
Sun-setting Lindsay Capps, appointed Chief Education Officer 
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(2015) Organizational name changes to Chief Education Office 
Shifted focus on collaboration v. technical oversight 
Adopted a lens for equity and partnerships 
Oregon Education Investment Fund not in use 
Rebranding 
(2017) 
Colt Gill, Chief Innovation Officer appointed by governor 
New focus on community engagement qualitative analysis 
New charge to advise Educator Advancement Council  
Evolving business initiative for longitudinal student database 
 
Creation (2011). Governor Kitzhaber established the Oregon Education 
Investment Board (OEIB) during the 2011 legislative session through Senate Bill 909. SB 
909 required the board to consist of the governor and twelve members appointed by the 
governor. In addition, the governor appointed Chief Education Officer, Rudy Crew, who 
previously served as the chancellor of the New York City Board of Education. The OEIB 
was charged with (a) creating a cohesive public education system from early childhood 
into post-secondary education by developing and overseeing the Early Learning Council 
and Higher Education Coordinating Commission, (b) “recommending strategic 
investments in order to ensure that the public education budget is integrated and targeted 
to achieve the education outcomes established for the state,” which would later be 
addressed in Senate Bill 253 (O.R.S. 909, 2011, p. 1), and (c) monitoring the effect of 
strategic investments and how they support the P-20 continuum by developing a 
longitudinal, statewide, student-based data system.  
Underlying all of these initiatives were two core components. First, Senate Bill 
253 established the high school and college completion goal: By 2025, 40% of young 
adults would have a Bachelor’s degree or higher, 40% of young adults would have an 
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Associate’s degree or higher, and 20% of young adults would have a high school diploma 
or equivalent (O.R.S. 253, 2011). Second, the Oregon Education Investment Fund was 
created within the State Treasury, separate from the General Fund of educational monies, 
for the purpose of funding, “duties of the board related to early childhood services and 
public education from kindergarten through post-secondary education.” Ultimately, in 
2011, the creation and ideation behind the development of the OEIB was to “oversee a 
unified public education system that begins with early childhood services and continues 
throughout public education from kindergarten to post-secondary education,” (O.R.S. 
909, 2011).  
Implementation (2013). Between 2011 and 2013 Rudy Crew resigned and a local 
Oregon superintendent, Nancy Golden, was appointed to the role of Chief Education 
Officer. During this time, most of the initiatives for which the OEIB were charged were 
underway. Most notably, the strategic investments were disseminated across the state and 
technical support and research was resourced within the OEIB for this purpose. The Early 
Learning Council and the Higher Education Coordinating Commission were developed 
and taking on the 40-40-20 vision. Finally, the OEIB had developed relevant policy 
initiative reports for the state legislature during each legislative session. However, the 
challenge of creating the longitudinal, statewide, student-based data system provided one 
of the initial challenges for the public-private organization: designing structures and 
systems for cross-organizational partnerships for data sharing and collaboration.  
Sunsetting (2015). In 2015 the OEIB was slated to meet their sunset. Many 
changes highlighted that year for the organization, some fundamental to their charge and 
others a part of their new structural shift into becoming the Chief Education Office as 
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enacted in SB 253. In 2015 Governor Kitzhaber resigned over personal accusations about 
his partner and soon after Nancy Golden resigned from Chief Education Officer. At that 
time, Lindsey Capps, who had been serving as Chief of Staff to Nancy Golden was 
named the Chief Education Officer and the governor’s Education Policy Advisor. With 
the new legislation organized in SB 253, the OEIB underwent a name change to the Chief 
Education Office and although the Oregon Education Investment Fund was still intact 
under legislation, it was no longer in use for strategic investments. Fundamental to the 
work of the organization, the CEdO substantively shifted their focus from oversight to 
collaboration across state agencies, regional education districts, and educational 
networks. In addition, the CEdO adopted an equity lens that undergirded the nature of 
their partnerships, research, and initiatives.   
 Rebranding (2017). Since its creation, the purpose of the OEIB/ CEdO was 
unclear to the public. The OEIB fundamentally changed during each legislative session. 
In 2017, the governor appointed a Chief Innovation Officer, Colt Gill, formerly a 
superintendent in Oregon. The Chief Innovation Officer’s work focused on implementing 
a statewide community engagement initiative and highlighting concerns from Oregon 
communities. Aligned with this approach to policy formulation, the CEdO continued 
using their equity frame to improve their partnerships and, in response to legislation, 
began advising the new Educator Advancement council. Also, under transition during 
2017, the longitudinal, statewide, student-based data system evolved from a research- 
focused development to a business case for policy implementation. Along with these 
changes and the changes in staff and leadership at the OEIB/ CEdO the initiatives, 
practices, and future of the organization remain unclear to the public. 
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Social Network Analysis 
 With a focus on the structure of groups, communities, organizations, or systems, 
social network analysis (SNA) explores how interpersonal ties matter (e.g. whether they 
transmit information, behaviors, or capital). SNA provides a methodology for 
conceptualizing, analyzing, and interpreting these social networks (De Nooy, Mrvar, & 
Batageli, 2011). At its foundation, SNA is based on graph theory, where a graph is a set 
of vertices or nodes and lines or ties between pairs of vertices. A node is the smallest unit 
in a social network; it represents an actor. A tie between two vertices represents any 
social relation. Ties can be directed (e.g. nodes nominate or direct the relationship to 
another node) or undirected (e.g. nodes cooperate on a project or sit on the same board). 
With additional information about the nodes and ties (e.g. attributes), the graph becomes 
a network.    
Network structure. Most broadly, networks are analyzed for their structural 
characteristics (see Appendix). For example, density refers to the total number of ties in a 
network expressed as a proportion to the total possible number of ties (de Nooy, Mrvar, 
& Batagelj, 2011). Since density is dependent on the size of the network it is not 
comparable across networks and average degree can also be used to determine the 
average number of ties adjacent with a node across all nodes in a network. Networks with 
lower density or cohesion result in heterogeneity of ideas that might lead to non-
redundant ideas or innovation networks. On the other hand, groups with higher density or 
cohesion lead to stronger team viability (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Analyses can also 
account for the weighted property of the ties between legislators by measuring node 
strength. The strength of a node represents the weight of their multiple ties with another 
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individual node. Finally, closeness centralization measured the global reachability for all 
nodes within a network. Conceptually, closeness centrality at the node level represents an 
individuals’ independence in relation to the other nodes in a network. From a 
measurement perspective, closeness centralization for the global network indicates the 
variation in the closeness centrality of the vertices divided by the maximum variation in 
the closeness centrality scores possible in a network of the same size. 
Cohesive subgroups. Building upon structural properties of networks and their 
embedded ties, dense groups of nodes that interact intensely or share attributes within a 
network are referred to as cohesive subgroups (de Nooy et al., 2011). Cohesive subgroups 
usually represent forms of social homogeneity and can be identified by analyzing 
network connectedness (i.e. the nature of paths between nodes as indirect or direct). An 
analysis of the structural cohesion of a whole network defines three classes of 
information about cohesive subgroups: (a) the collectivity of a whole group, (b) the 
positional properties of subgroups relative to other subgroups within a network, or (c) an 
individual’s membership property (Moody & White, 2003). Modularity also provides 
information about cohesive subgroups by comparing the density of links within 
subgroups of nodes to links between subgroups. (Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, & 
Lefebvre, 2008). By determining the degree of connectivity within a subgroup one can 
better understand the extent to which a subgroup is robust to disruption and remains 
cohesive (Moody & White, 2003). 
Homophily and heterophily. Another way to investigate the formation and 
function of networks is the study of homophily, or the social principle that “contact 
between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people,” 
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(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001, p. 416). Homophily implies that information 
or ideas shared within networks will usually be consolidated among people with similar 
characteristics (e.g. legislators from the same political party). A less commonly studied 
principle, heterophily, refers to social interactions or relationships between people with 
dissimilar characteristics. For example, considering that the OEIB intended to build 
social capital through common votes or ideas shared across party lines, the goal of the 
OEIB was to instill a pattern of heterophily among legislators. McPherson et al. (2001) 
explain that the social homogeneity within organizations is a homophilous baseline of the 
co-membership networks, in relation to this study this translates into the strong partisan 
voting patterns in the Oregon legislature. Given that the intention of the OEIB is to instill 
a common legislative agenda across all legislators, I predict that the implementation of 
the OEIB and consolidated education governance will increase heterophily or bipartisan 
voting.  
Summary 
 Because there was a state shift toward governor-led and centralized state 
education governance models in 2011, attending to how legislators’ party affiliation 
dynamically relates to their voting patterns during a governance shift is a valuable 
investigation that will develop a nuanced understanding of education governance and 
policymaking for states making similar shifts in the future. Previous research found that 
centralized governing bodies reinforced by political legislation provided collaborative 
initiatives for the community (Innes et al., 2010; Woolman & Fleish, 2008). In addition, 
the literature explains that central partnerships liberate participants to use non-dominant 
discourse within their formal partnerships through mutual understanding, shared 
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knowledge, and common agenda setting goals (Timm, 2014; Innes et al., 2010). Thus, it 
is hypothesized here that a centralized governance model will be associated with 
increased likelihood for legislators from different political parties to form new and 
maintain existing ties. 
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The Current Study 
This study employed descriptive social network analysis measures and separable 
temporal exponential random graph modeling (STERGM) to investigate how an 
education governance model with consolidated authority over legislative proposals and 
policymaking relates to bipartisan outcomes for education related legislation in Oregon. 
Oregon legislator voting networks were analyzed descriptively using cohesion, centrality, 
and community detection measures. Then, legislator attributes were analyzed to 
determine how they related to the likelihood of common votes on education-related bills. 
First, legislators’ attributes (e.g. gender, party, and title) were modeled to test the 
association they had on the likelihood of a common vote with legislative peers. To study 
bipartisanship, differential heterophily, I added the legislators’ political party attributes 
within dyads to analyze the association that having different political parties had on 
legislators’ common votes. This study treated the introduction of the OEIB in Oregon as 
a multicomponent “intervention” variable. Voting data were collected for all Oregon state 
senators and state representatives for 2009-2017. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between the move to 
consolidated education governance authority and legislator voting networks on 
education-related bills. Specifically, I address the following research questions:  
1. To what extent is the Oregon legislator voting network cohesive, central, and 
grouped by communities at each time point?  
2. To what extent do legislator attributes (e.g. gender, party, and title) change 
legislators’ likelihood of voting commonly on education-related bills at each time 
point? 
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3. To what extent did legislators’ differential party affiliation predict their likelihood 
to form ties from one legislative session to the next? 
4.  To what extent did legislators’ differential party affiliation predict their likelihood 
to persist ties already formed from one legislative session to the next? 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
Sample 
All Oregon state representatives and senators serving between 2009 and 2017 
were the participants in the current study. No eligibility or exclusion criteria were used to 
restrict legislator vote data in the sample. Thus, non-voters, legislators from and those 
serving any number of years during the studied period were included in the pooled 
sample within their appropriate cohort years. In Oregon, the number of representatives, 
60, and senators, 30, remains roughly the same each year. A total of 159 unique 
legislators were included in the study across all five years of data collection. Of the 159 
legislators, ten are represented twice in the dataset because they served as both a senator 
and a representative during the time period from 2009 to 2017. These legislators are 
represented twice based on the assumption that their voting patterns were dependent on 
the different contexts of the House and Senate. 
Table 3 illustrates legislator demographic data, gender, and party affiliation by 
year and representation in House or Senate. Demographic makeup of legislators remained 
mostly constant across sessions included in the study from 2009 – 2017.  The Democratic 
Party represented the majority of legislators included in the study each year. However, in 
2011, Republican representatives in the house increased from 24 legislators to 30, 
eventually leveling back out in the following years included in the study. Representation 
from female senators decreased across legislative sessions from 2009 to 2017, while 
representation from female representatives in the house increased across the same time 
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period. Females represented between 26.67 and 36.67% of legislators in the House and 
26.67 to 40% of the legislators in the Senate between 2009 and 2017, while males 
represented between 63.33 to 73.33% in the House and 60 to 70% in the Senate. 
 38 
Table 3 
Legislator Demographic Characteristic Counts (and Percentages) by Year and Governing Body 
 2009 
 
2011 
 
2013 
 
2015 
 
2017 
 H S H S H S H S H S 
Gender               
    M 44 (73.33) 
18 
(60.00)  
42 
(70.00) 
21 
(70.00)  
40 
(66.67) 
22 
(73.33)  
39 
(65.00) 
22 
(73.33)  
38 
(63.33) 
22 
(73.33) 
    F 16 (26.67) 
12 
(40.00)  
18 
(30.00) 
9 
(30.00)  
20 
(33.33) 
8 
(26.67)  
21 
(36.00) 
8 
(26.67)  
22 
(36.67) 
8 
(26.67) 
Party               
    R 24 (40.00) 
12 
(40.00)  
30 
(50.00) 
14 
(46.67)  
26 
(43.33) 
14 
(46.67)  
25 
(41.67) 
12 
(40.00)  
25 
(41.67) 
13 
(43.33) 
    D 36 (60.00) 
18 
(60.00)  
30 
(50.00) 
16 
(53.33)  
34 
(56.67) 
16 
(53.33)  
35 
(58.33) 
18 
(60.00)  
35 
(58.33) 
17 
(56.67) 
Note. H = representatives of the House; S = senators of the Senate.  
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Measures 
 Data obtained from the Oregon Legislative State (OLS) Database across five 
successive regular legislative sessions between 2009 and 2017 were analyzed using social 
network analysis. The OLS database was queried for bills within the regular sessions of 
years 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017 whose summaries included the term education 
(N = 354). Two classes of data were collected for all included bills: (a) legislators’ 
individual votes on the included education bills or their reason for not responding and (b) 
legislators’ covariate data (e.g. gender, party, and title).  
 Legislator votes. In this study, the legislator voting data are used to illustrate the 
changing shifts in variance among legislator voting patterns. Table 4 illustrates the two-
stage process that I took to isolate this variance among legislator votes on education-
related bills. First, I evaluated each bill in the pool sample to ensure that it directly 
referred to K-12, higher education, or education governance. In doing so, I removed 117 
bills, leaving 237 bills in the Stage 1 sample. Second, I explored the distribution of the 
remaining 237 bills (see Table 5) to determine a cut-off point where the proportion of 
legislators voting yay on a bill increased substantially. I found that the legislative 
distributions were left-skewed, where most bills were at a higher percent of yay votes and 
the arithmetic mean was always less than the 50th percentile. I determined that the largest 
increase in percent agreement occurred between the minimum percent agreement and the 
first quartile. In order to remove the most homogeneity or agreement on passing bills, I 
chose to remove bills above the first quartile. In doing so I removed a total of 180 bills 
from the pooled sample, leaving 57 bills in Stage 2 and the final sample.  
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Table 4 
Number of Bills Included in the Sample After Each Refinement Stage 
Year Pooled sample Stage 1: Removed non-education related bills 
Stage 2: Removed bills 
homogeneity above 25th 
percentile of percent 
yay votes 
2009 42 18 6 
2011 69 49 10 
2013 86 63 15 
2015 85 58 14 
2017 72 49 12 
Total 354 237 57 
Note. Numbers represent bill sample remaining after evaluative criteria were applied.  
 
Table 5 
Distribution of Percent Yay Votes on Bills Included at Stage 1 of Refinement  
 Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max Average 
2009 .52 .78 .88 .97 .98 .85 
2011 .56 .84 .94 .98 1 .89 
2013 .58 .81 .93 .97 1 .88 
2015 .57 .86 .93 .98 1 .88 
2017 .56 .87 .93 .98 .99 .91 
Note. These data were used to determine the bills included in the final bill sample.  
  
Table 6 provides summary bill and roll call data for the resulting sample of bills 
(N = 57). These data were organized in two-mode matrices for each year. In social 
network analysis, bipartite or two-mode networks consist of two different types of nodes, 
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such as people and organizations or legislators and bills. Breiger (1974) describes how 
two-mode networks can be projected onto a single mode algebraically to facilitate 
interpretation. Thus, similar to Alvarez and Sinclair (2011), I consider the roll call data 
for each legislative session as representing a matrix of agreement that can be used to 
describe social connections between legislators. The two-mode matrices were 
transformed into one-mode matrices, legislators by legislators, where relations 
represented the number of times legislators voted yes commonly on a bill included in the 
study. Legislator networks were analyzed at each time point, never pooled across time 
points, due to missing data in the pooled network (e.g. all votes and legislators from 2009 
– 2017) when legislators were not present during a legislative session. This decision 
reduced biased estimates across the Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) and 
Separable Temporal Random Graph Model (STERGM) (Benton & You, 2017). 
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Table 6 
Summary of Bill and Roll-Call Data by Legislative Session 
Year Total bills 
Total 
votes 
Total not 
present 
Total 
aye 
Total 
nay 
% same 
legislator 
2009 6 449 31 7% 
310 
69% 
108 
24% NA 
2011 10 900 20 2% 
643 
71% 
237 
26% 83% 
2013 15 1,350 51 4% 
933 
69% 
366 
27% 79% 
2015 14 1,170 42 4% 
819 
70% 
309 
26% 79% 
2017 12 1,079 39 4% 
829 
77% 
206 
19% 80% 
Note. % same legislator refers to the number of legislators serving in the indicated year 
who were also serving the previous year.  
 
Covariate data. In addition to roll call data for each included bill, covariate data 
for legislators were also analyzed. Legislative gender, party, and title were compiled in 
separate vectors and included in the analyses for each legislative session as nodal 
attributes incorporated into network measures of cohesiveness, centrality, and community 
detection. The covariate variables were also included as dyadic attributes serving as 
predictors of tie formation likelihood among the annual network data.   
Missing data. Each matrix was analyzed for missing data due either to (a) an 
absence from the session or (b) a legislator not serving during the session. Table 6 
illustrates that between 2 and 7% of roll call data were missing due to legislators’ absence 
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from the floor. Techniques for analyzing and accounting for missing data in dynamic 
network analyses are still under development; however, Leifeld, Cranmer, and Desmarais 
(2017) propose a two-step approach for handling non-response and incomplete data for 
longitudinal models including cross-sectional panel data. First, the missing data due to 
absence (n = 2-7%) were imputed with a modal value 0, as recommended by Leifeld, et 
al. (2017). Ingold and Leifeld (2016) explain that accounting for missing data this way is 
justifiable on the grounds that the voting data are undirected and do not misrepresent a 
potential directed tie (Ingold & Leifeld, 2016). Second, legislators with complete missing 
data in a session because they were not an acting legislator at that time point were 
removed from that year’s model altogether (Leifeld, et al., 2017). Although the resulting 
five networks were not wholly identical because they did not have the exact same 
legislators, their one-mode matrices were symmetrical, represented by a 90 x 90 legislator 
matrix (Leifeld et al., 2017). Therefore, ERGM and STERGM estimations were still 
feasible given that row and column names representing nodes and their attributes are 
embedded accurately within the respective objects referenced in the formulas (Leifeld et 
al., 2017).  
Data were prepared and analyzed for this dissertation using the statistical 
computing environment R (R Core Team, 2016). Data analysis and visualization were 
conducted with base R, as well as the tidyverse package (Hadley, 2017), the igraph 
package (Csardi & Nepusz, 2006) and the statnet package (Handcock, et al., 2016). 
Social network analysis was used to address all research questions. First, exploratory 
social network analysis was used to investigate the network structure (e.g. cohesion, 
subgroups, and centralization) for each year included in the study. Second, an exponential 
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random graph model (ERGM) was used to determine the association that legislator 
attributes had with the probability of legislators to form ties with one another for each 
time point relating to the evolution of the Oregon Education Investment Board. Third, an 
extension of the ERGM, the separable temporal exponential random graph model 
(STERGM), was used to analyze the bipartisan voting patterns occurring in relation to 
each time point over the evolution of the Oregon Education Investment Board. The 
ERGM used Markov chain Monte Carlo maximum likelihood estimation (MCMC-MLE) 
(Snijders, Pattison, Robins, & Handcock, 2006), while the STERGM used Conditional 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (CMLE) (Krivitsky and Handcock, 2014). The Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) was used to determine model fit with the ERGM and 
STERGM analyses (Akaike, 1973). 
Analyses 
In social network analysis, the selection of network statistics used to analyze the 
network data should be informed by theory, just like a traditional regression model 
(Cranmer, 2011). In this study of the Oregon legislator voting network, I posit that the 
centralized governance model developed and evolving between 2009 and 2017 
established cause for increased bipartisan voting on education-related bills. Hence, our 
analyses follow a model building process to investigate (a) the network structure for each 
year, (b) the association between legislator characteristics and tie formation, and (c) the 
likelihood that legislators maintained ties across each time point from 2009 to 2017. 
More importantly, the results must be interpreted in the context of multicomponent 
intervention described above in Table 2.   
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Three analytic phases were used to address the four research questions. The first 
phase addressed Research Question 1 with an exploratory social network analysis to 
determine the network structure of Oregon legislators each time point of interest (e.g. 
density, centrality, and cohesion). The second phase addressed Research Question 2 
employing an exponential random graph model (ERGM) to estimate the likelihood that 
legislator characteristics associated with tie formation with other legislators. The third 
phase addressed Research Questions 3 and 4 employing a separable temporal exponential 
random graph model (STERGM) to estimate the likelihood that bipartisan voting patterns 
were constant across time points. Each analysis is described below.  
 Exploratory social network analysis. Social network analysis was used to 
analyze descriptively legislator voting patterns on education-related bills across years 
included in the study (2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 217). I assume that legislators’ co-
voting patterns represent a social relationship that implies a network exists based on their 
strategic interactions and similar or dissimilar ideas (Alaverz & Sinclair, 2011; 
Cherepnalkoski, Karpf, Mozetic, & Grcar, 2016). Voting data organized by bill and 
legislator were collected for each legislative session where voting possibility was yes (1) 
or no (0). The data were transformed into an implicit adjacency matrix, A, where the 
number of co-votes of legislators, !"#, is the binary indicator that is 1 if the legislator i co-
votes for a bill l that with legislator j, and 0 if not. Each term, !"#, can be conceptualized 
as the representation of proximity between legislators i and j. With the term !"# I 
calculated network-level characteristics, (a) cohesion, (b) centrality, and (c) communities.  
This analysis visualized legislators within their one-mode, undirected, weighted 
networks tied by their common votes with their colleagues. The direct or distant ties 
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between legislators within this network affect the structure of their social position within 
the voting network (Granovetter, 1985). This study measured the whole network by its 
density, average network degree, average network strength, and closeness centralization. 
This study also measured modularity, a scale score from -1 to 1, at each time point 
representing the legislative networks.  
The analyses also included cohesive blocking based on legislator characteristics 
(e.g., degree and connectedness) by employing an algorithm that iteratively removed 
nodes and bound nodes together (Mizruchi, 1990). This cohesive blocking procedure 
iteratively removed nodes until the resulting subgroup was not connected to any other 
group of legislators. As the weakly connected legislators were removed and strong 
subgroups remained, the analysis revealed the nested composition of cohesive subgroups 
(Moody & White, 2003). Each unique subgroup within a network shares a common 
connectivity value and belongs to a single class or subgroup (Moody & White, 2003). 
 Understanding main effects of legislator characteristics. In this study, an 
exponential random graph model (ERGM) was used to explore how legislator 
characteristics or nodal attributes related to tie formation between legislators. An ERGM 
estimates parameters for statistics by maximizing the probability of the observed network 
over randomly distributed networks with the same node sets that could have been 
observed (Cranmer, 2017). Using this probability model, endogenous variables related to 
network structure (dyad dependent) or exogenous variables related to node or tie 
attributes (dyad independent) are included to investigate their relationship to tie 
formation (Cherepnalkoski et al., 2016). The general ERGM probability specifications 
for a network are modeled by,  
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$(& = () = *+,	(./0(1))2(.) , 
(1) 
where Y is the random state of the network variable, y is the realization of the adjacency 
matrix underlying the network structure, g(y) represents the vector of various endogenous 
or exogenous model statistics for network y,  4 represents the vector of coefficients for 
the chosen statistics, and 5(4) is a constant summing all possible permutations of the 
network constrained to be the same as network y to ensure proper probability distribution.  
 Based on these specifications, an ERGM simply computes the probability of the 
observed network over the potential networks observed, involving only minimal 
assumptions (Cranmer, 2017). The legislator voting network under study met the two 
assumptions required for accurately interpreting ERGM parameters, (a) there was an 
equal probability of observing any of the networks with the same values of the statistics 
included in the specified model (e.g. the model was completely and accurately specified), 
and (b) the observed network exhibited the average value of each statistic over the 
networks that could be observed (this is similar to the assumption of normality in 
regression models) (Cranmer, 2017). The ERGM in this study was estimated using 
MCMC-MLE, the most preferred method for estimating cross-sectional ERGMs (a single 
network at one-time point) (Snijders, Pattison, Robins, & Handcock, 2006). Through the 
model building process, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) was used to determine 
model fit to account for additional parameters (Akaike, 1973). Following accurate 
requirements for model specifications, the main effects ERGM model specification also 
included an edges term to account for general interdependence even though Research 
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Question 1 primarily focused on exogenous covariates of legislators (e.g. party, title, and 
gender) (Cranmer, 2017).  
 Following a model building process, the ERGM began with a simple random 
graph model, or null model, establishing a baseline for the edges term (e.g. the number of 
ties in the network). The null model is depicted by rearranging Equation 1 to provide the 
coefficients for calculating the probability of tie formation  
6789: ;$<&"# = 1>	&"#?@A = 6B C;&"# = 1D	&"#?AC;&"# = 0D	&"#?A 4FG(8(("#)), 
(2) 
where (8(("#))represents the change statistic for the included parameter, here the edges 
term, and 4F represents the coefficient of the specified term. In network statistics, the 
change statistic represents the change in network statistics when an edge between nodes i 
and j is added (when &"# becomes 1, not 0). Using Equation 2, the coefficient and change 
statistics are transformed into probabilities using a logistic function 
 H = IIJ*+,	(K.). 
(3) 
After the null model was established, a dyadic independence model was used to 
answer Research Question 2. The dyadic independence model estimated the main effects 
of nodal attributes or relationship of nodal attributes with the likelihood of a tie being 
formed between two legislators. The dyadic independence model assumed that each dyad 
was independent of all other dyads in the model, so the likelihood of a link between 
legislator A and B are not related to a link between legislator B and C (Harris, 2014). The 
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dyadic independence model predicted the probability of a tie between network members 
of varying classifications within the vectors of nodal attributes (e.g. party, title, or 
gender). The nodefactor parameter was included in the ERGM specification to account 
for main effects of legislator party, title, and gender, where the reference groups were 
removed because these were categorical variables. The main effects coefficients were 
transformed into odds ratios and confidence intervals to further interpret their meaning.   
 Longitudinal analysis of heterophily. An extension of the ERGM family, 
STERGMS use two discrete time models to estimate parameters of tie (a) formation, and 
(b) persistence (Krivitsky & Handcock, 2014). The STERGM is appropriate when ties are 
states and hence their initiation and duration can be modeled (in this case the state is the 
legislative session and legislator votes). In this study, the changing relations between 
legislators based on their votes represent the dynamic data that were modeled to estimate 
the likelihood that ties were created and maintained from time t to time t+1, between 
legislative sessions from years 2009 – 2017.  
What is separable in a STERGM is the assumption that tie formation and dissolution are 
distinct, therefore STERGMs really include two models, (a) one to predict which ties 
form by time t+1 (Equation 4), conditioned on their absence at t, (b) the other to predict 
which ties dissolve by time t+1, conditioned by their presence at t (Equation 5).  
6B $<&"#,MJI = 1>	&"#? , &"#,M = 0@$<&"#,MJI = 0>	&"#? , &"#,M = 0@ = 4JG(8J(())"#, 
(4) 
6B C;&"#,MJI = 1D	&"#?, &"#,M = 1AC;&"#,MJI = 0D	&"#?, &"#,M = 1A = 4KG(8K(())"#, 
(5) 
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where the model is an extension of the ERGM model denoted in Equation 2. The 
extensions added to the models include, (a) a time index added to the tie values, (b) a 
conditional added (e.g. in the formation equation the expression is conditional on the tie 
not existing prior and in the dissolution equation it is conditional on the tie existing 
prior), (c) the coefficient and statistic vectors were redefined for formation (+) and 
dissolution (-), and (d) the dissolution model represents persistence rather than 
dissolution because the $<&"#,MJI = 1@ term is included in the numerator and the $<&"#,MJI = 0@ term is included in the denominator to parallel that of the formation 
model. These STERGM specifications had the advantage of offering clarity to the 
network processes for tie formation distinct from tie persistence or stability as it was 
portrayed in the observed legislator networks. 
 Following the recommendations of Schaefer and Marcum (in press), the 
theoretical treatment of tie formation and dissolution drove our modeling specifications. 
Similar to Mousavi’s (2016) study of political networks, this study modeled bipartisan 
voting patterns, through tie formation and tie dissolution between times t to times t+1. 
That is, the STERGM explored how the evolution of the centralized governance model 
associated with bipartisan voting at each time interval. Specifically, our theory posits that 
tie formation and persistence for legislators from one legislative session to the next were 
two different dynamic processes based on the context of the governance model and that 
they must be accounted for in the STERGM (Schaefer & Marcum, in press). In addition, I 
assumed a foundational treatment of time in our model, departing from other dynamic 
network models, in that time was not modeled continuously, but was instead assumed to 
be conditionally independent from one interval to the next (Schaefer & Marcum, in 
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press). In contrast to the ERGM, the STERGM was estimated using Conditional 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (CMLE) to model the transition between two networks 
from time t to time t+1 (Handcock, et al., 2016). Similar to the ERGM, the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) was used to determine model fit (Akaike, 1973).  
 The baseline model contained two edge terms, one for tie formation and 
dissolution and one for heterophily or bipartisan voting. The formation and dissolution 
terms accounted for the likelihood of tie formation and dissolution endogenous to the 
network between observations. While the exogenous parameter, party, accounted for the 
bipartisan voting patterns between two legislators. Differential heterophily was modeled 
for the exogenous covariate using the nodemix term. To interpret the coefficients, the 
probability of the parameters was calculated using the change statistics.   
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CHAPTER III 
Results  
 Results from the exponential random graph model (ERGM) and separable 
temporal exponential random graph model (STERGM) suggest that the data utilized in 
this study exhibited the average value of each statistic included in the models that could 
be observed, however they did not meet the assumption that the models were accurately 
specified (Cranmer, Leifeld, McClurg, & Rolfe, 2017). The ERGM and STERGM 
models were conditioned on the base parameter endogenous to the network, edges, or the 
likelihood of forming ties generally. This resulted in some very large confidence intervals 
in the ERGM and large standard errors in the STERGM. With the edges parameter 
included in the models to maintain unbiased estimates and the covariates of interest (e.g. 
gender, party, title, and bipartisanship), there was potential for multicollinearity that 
reduced the internal validity of the estimates. Therefore, the ERGM parameter estimates 
that were significant (i.e. the confidence intervals were above or below 1) are interpreted 
with caution because they may not be precise given their large confidence intervals. The 
STERGM parameter estimates that were estimated by the model (some were not 
estimated by the model due to multicollinearity) and significant all related to the 
endogenous network term, edges, and are reported with caution due to the overlapping 
relationship between the edges term and bipartisan ties. 
Cohesive Legislator Networks 
Table 7 provides summary statistics for the structural properties of (a) cohesion, 
(b) centrality, and (c) communities for each legislator voting network from 2009 to 2017. 
For each legislator network from 2009 to 2017, nearly all of the possible ties were 
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actualized, ranging from 97.25% to 99.95% complete. The highest density (i.e., 99.65%) 
occurred in 2011, the creation stage of the OEIB, and in 2013 (i.e., 99.95%), the 
implementation stage of the OEIB. On average, legislators’ degree, or the number of 
other legislators for which they were connected, ranged from 86.25 to 88.96 out of 90 
total legislators. Like network density, legislators’ average degree also approached 
maximum values during 2011 (M = 88.69, SD=0.93) and 2013 (M=88.96, SD=0.26). 
Average legislator strength, or legislators’ weighted ties, rose steadily from 2009 
(M=259.42, SD=83.38) to 2017 (M=644.51, SD=202.99). Each network’s closeness 
centralization, or the extent to which legislators were generally reachable or close with 
other legislators within the network, decreased from 2009 (0.0489) to 2011 (0.0069) and 
then again in 2013 (0.009).  
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Table 7 
Descriptive Summary of Legislator Voting Networks 
 2009  2011  2013  2015  2017 
 M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Average 
degree 86.56 4.79 
 88.69 0.93  88.96 0.26  86.25 2.11  88.51 1.60 
Average 
strength 259.42 83.38 
 460.53 112.48  632.18 238.64  620.91 259.32  644.51 202.99 
Network 
density 0.9725 
 0.9965  0.9995  0.9914  0.9945 
Closeness 
Centralization 
0.0498 
 
0.0069 
 
0.0009 
 
0.0156 
 
0.0105 
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Table 8 provides the summary statistics of the cohesive subgroups included in 
legislator networks from 2009 to 2017. More cohesive subgroups were detected in 2009 
(n = 6), prior to the creation of the OIEB, than any other year included in the study. The 
most cohesive subgroup of the six (i.e. the k-core) included 83 of the 90 legislators, all of 
who reached a degree of at least 79. The legislators’ cohesive subgroups within the 
networks decreased in frequency but increased cohesiveness in 2011 (n = 2), with 86 of 
the 90 legislators in the network reaching at least 85 degrees, and in 2013 (n = 2), with 89 
of the 90 legislators reaching at least 86 degrees. The cohesive subgroups increased in 
2015 (n = 3), during the sun setting of the OEIB, and in 2017 (n = 4), during the 
rebranding of the OEIB. Following a complementary pattern, modularity, or the density 
of ties within versus outside of cohesive subgroups, increased from 2009 (0.03) to 2011 
(0.04), holding constant during 2013, and then decreasing during 2015 (0.02) and 2017 
(0.01).  
The representation of legislator attributes within each k-core was fairly steady 
from 2009 to 2017 for gender and title (Female = 31.33–34.48%; Male = 65.52–68.67%; 
Senator = 31.40–34.88%; Representative = 65.12–68.60%). Democratic representation 
dropped nearly ten percentage points from 2009 (62.65%) to 2011 (53.48%), remained 
somewhat constant in 2013, and then increased again in 2015 (61.63%). Conversely, 
Republican representation increased from 2009 (37.35%) to 2011 (46.12%), remained 
constant in 2013, and decreased again in 2015 (38.37%).  
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Table 8 
Descriptive Summary of Communities Within Legislator Voting Networks 
 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 
Modularity 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 
Cohesive blocks 6 2 2 3 4 
Max degree/ n 79/83 85/86 88/89 81/86 85/87 
Democrat 52  
62.65% 
46  
53.48% 
49  
55.05% 
53  
61.63% 
52  
59.77% 
Republican 31  
37.35% 
40  
46.12% 
40  
44.94% 
33  
38.37% 
35  
40.23% 
Female 26  
31.33% 
27  
31.40% 
28  
31.46% 
28  
32.56% 
30  
34.48% 
Male 57  
68.67% 
59  
68.60% 
61  
68.54% 
58  
67.44% 
57  
65.52% 
Senators 27 
 32.53% 
27  
31.40% 
30  
33.71% 
30  
34.88% 
28  
32.19% 
Representatives 56  
67.47% 
59  
68.60% 
59  
66.29% 
56  
65.12% 
59  
67.82% 
 
Increasing Tie Likelihood 
All findings reported about the relationship between legislator attributes (e.g. 
gender, party, and title) were conditioned on the base parameter, edges, or the likelihood 
of forming ties generally. In 2011, females were 3.8 times more likely than males to vote 
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commonly on education bills compared to their male colleagues, 95% CI [1.12, 12.86] 
(see Figure 3). Given the large range between the lower and upper bounds, this estimate 
is not precise. Compared to Democratic legislators, Republican legislators were 6.6 times 
less likely to vote commonly on education-related bills in 2009, 7.7 times less likely in 
2015, and 8.3 times less likely in 2017, 95% CIs [0.11, 0.23], [0.06, 0.25], and [0.05, 
0.29], respectively (see Figure 4). Most notably, these were narrow lower and upper 
bound estimates indicating precision. Regarding legislators’ title, there were no 
significant findings (see Figure 5), and there was not enough variability to estimate an 
accurate parameter in 2013 because the network voting data were so dense.  
Figure 3. Female legislators’ likelihood in odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals for 
voting commonly compared to males. 
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Figure 4. Republican legislators’ likelihood in odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals 
for voting commonly compared to Democrats. 
 
Figure 5. Senator legislators’ likelihood in odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals for 
voting commonly compared to representatives. 
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Missing Parameter Estimates 
 Table 9 depicts each time interval included in the separable temporal exponential 
random graph model (STERGM). During each time interval, the parameters for tie 
formation were (a) non-significant or (b) not estimated. Due to the density of the 
networks, the parameters for the formation and persistence models of the 2011–2013 
time-interval and the formation model of the 2013–2015 time-interval results in 
coefficients were not estimated, most likely because there was not sufficient variance. 
ERGM family models are known for their instability in some measurement cases, where 
even if specification of the model is intuitive and driven by theory, the models will not 
estimate parameters (Cranmer et al., 2017). This is especially true for cases where 
networks are very sparse or very dense, like in the case of the legislator networks under 
investigation in this study. 
 The only statistically significant findings resulting from the STERGM occurred 
within the persistence models for the endogenous variable: edges. In between 2009 and 
2011, 2013 and 2015, and 2015 and 2017, legislators were 99% likely to make a tie with 
another legislator (p < .001). Although persistence estimates for bipartisanship are not 
significant in this model and interpreted with caution, it is notable that the predicted 
probability for legislators to maintain bipartisan ties between 2009 and 2011, which was 
during the creation of the OEIB, was 76%. This predicted likelihood is rather high 
compared to the likelihood for legislators to maintain bipartisan ties during the 2013 to 
2015 (36%) and 2015 to 2017 (42%) time intervals.  
Understanding the non-significant trends underlying the STERGM model 
provides some insight into the longitudinal portion of this study, especially when 
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triangulated with the findings from the purely descriptive analyses presented in Figures 6. 
Figure 6 illustrates that, during 2011 and 2013, when the OEIB was created and its 
components were implemented, the legislator networks became very dense and formed 
one cohesive community. In comparison, during the pre- and post-OEIB eras (e.g. 2009, 
2015, & 2017), the legislator networks were slightly less dense, and some subgroups 
departed from the larger k-core to form their own central communities (see Figure 6). In 
addition, the weighted ties or strength of legislators’ relationships with one another 
increased post-OEIB reaching their highest values during 2017. In other words, Figure 6 
illustrates convergence across Democrat and Republican legislators in 2011 and 2013, 
whereas in 2009, 2015, and 2017 the networks appear to be somewhat more partisan.  
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Table 9 
Estimated Coefficients and Predicted Probabilities for STERGM Models  
 2009-2011    2011-2013   2013-2015  2015-2017 
 Formation  Persistence  Formation  Persistence  Formation  Persistence  Formation  Persistence 
 ! P  ! P  ! P  ! P  ! P  ! P  ! P  ! P 
Edges  
21.9 
(4256) 
1.0 
 5.29* 
(0.32) 
.99 
 
NA NA  NA NA 
 0 
(1.41) 
0 
 5.11* 
(0.29) 
.99 
 20.70 
(4357) 
1.0 
 5.41* 
(0.33) 
.99 
Node 
mix 
-18.40 
(4256) 
0 
 1.1586 
(0.66) 
.76 
 
NA NA  NA NA 
 
NA NA 
 -0.57 
(0.36) 
.36 
 -18.06 
(4357) 
0 
 -0.33 
(0.44) 
.42 
AIC 13.55  169.90  NA  NA  6.73  383.9  11.35  265.5 
Note. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and predicted probabilities are reported to the right of each coefficient. NA stands for not applicable and refers to models in which 
network density was collinear with predictor variables and parameters were not estimated.  
* p < 0.001.  
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Pre-OEIB (2009) 
 
Creation (2011) 
 
Implementation (2013) 
 
Sunsetting (2015) 
 
Rebranding (2017) 
 
Pre-OEIB (2009) 
 
Creation (2011) 
 
Implementation (2013) 
 
Sunsetting (2015) 
 
Rebranding (2017) 
Figure 6. Annual legislator networks depicting party attributes and communities with and without ties represented.  
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CHAPTER IV 
Discussion 
In 2011, Oregon was one of many states consolidating much of their education 
governance authority around early learning, K-12, and postsecondary education into a 
single entity (Zinth, 2011). The primary purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the 
relationship between this consolidated model and endogenous policy formulation 
processes, like legislators’ voting patterns. While education governance research usually 
investigates policy implementation, such as how districts redistribute resources, capacity-
building models for personnel, or system-changing statutes (Fowler, 2013), this study 
sought to investigate how the OEIB changed legislators’ association with policy 
formulation through legislative proposals. The longitudinal study documented the 
potential non-linear relationships internal to education governance networks, which have 
not been documented in the literature previously (O’Toole & Meier, 1999). Social 
network analyses were used to understand the extent to which (a) Oregon legislator 
networks were cohesive, central, and grouped by community, (b) legislator attributes (e.g. 
gender, party, and title) changed legislators’ likelihood of voting commonly on 
education-related bills, and (c) there was a tendency for legislators to form and maintain 
bipartisan ties between time points.  
Substantive Findings 
The results highlight evidence of how this consolidated education governance 
shift in 2011 potentially changed legislative processes. When the OEIB was created and 
implemented, legislator networks became more cohesive (e.g. fewer subgroups) and 
distributed (e.g. fewer central legislators) when compared to other years included in the 
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longitudinal study. It is possible that the OEIB prompted collaboration among legislators 
resulting in mutuality that increased the likelihood for underrepresented groups of 
legislators (e.g. females and Republicans) to vote commonly with their colleagues. 
Ultimately, legislator networks were very dense with a high likelihood of forming ties 
generally during the creation and implementation years of the OEIB.  
Legislator Networks’ Distributed Properties 
Communities and politicians have an equal role in education policymaking when 
education governance networks are applied instead of traditional bureaucracies (Cibulka, 
2001). As an education governance network, the OEIB created a cohesive central agency 
that connected constituents through their board meetings, coalitions organized by 
initiatives, and direct relationship with the Oregon Department of Education. SB 909 
(2011) aimed for social cohesion during the policy formulation stage by fostering 
mutuality across institutions (Knoke, 1990). For example, during the most intensive years 
of creation (2011) and implementation (2013), the legislator networks were more 
cohesive than the pre- and post-OEIB years (2009, 2015, & 2017). The frequency and 
strength of legislators’ connections with their colleagues increased during the creation 
and implementation years of the OEIB. Therefore, when the OEIB was most active, co-
voting was more common and relationships between legislators were stronger than during 
other years of the intervention.   
 Research posits that renewed interests from think tanks, special interest groups, 
and non-profits are overcoming governmental systems at the macro-political level that 
are designed to detour social shifts (Cibulka, 2001). The resulting policy formulation shift 
implies that the OEIB may have overcome existing governmental systems by proposing 
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legislation that highlighted legislators’ interests and mediated relationships between 
political parties (Cibulka, 2011). The results from the current study indicate that legislator 
relationships were spread broadly across all legislators for each year included in the 
study; in other words, there were few subgroups. From 2009 to 2017, the most cohesive 
subgroup among the legislators included 83 to 89 of the 90 legislators and the fewest 
subgroups (n = 2) were found during the creation and implementation years of the OEIB. 
It is possible that the OEIB provided an opportunity for legislators to compromise 
broadly within a systematic structure across the stakeholders (Cibulka, 2001). 
Additionally, I found that legislators’ relationships increased in strength during most time 
intervals included in the study. Consistent with existing research on governance 
networks, Oregon legislators may have engaged in increasing mutual sensemaking about 
the legislative proposals published by the OEIB and developed increasingly coherent 
relationships from 2009 to 2017 (Daly & Finnigan, 2012).  
 While bureaucratic policy formulation from higher levels of government have a 
negative effect on professional collaboration, more lateral systems across institutions 
achieve organizational change and information sharing (Daly & Finnigan, 2012). 
Consistent with this research, the current study found that legislator relationships were 
not central to a small group of legislators across each year included in the study, but 
during the creation and implementation years, the decentralized trend among legislator 
relationships was at its strongest. In other words, relationships among legislators and 
shared intellectual capital were shared across the network during the creation and 
implementation years more than any other years included in the study. The introduction 
of the OEIB may have prompted an already collaborative legislative body to become 
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even more collaborative across participants of different groups due to the shift from a 
bureaucratic policy formulation process to a networked approach (Innes et al., 2010). 
Underrepresented Legislators’ Changing Ties 
 State education governance actors have the most authority over education 
policymaking than local or federal actors (Fowler, 2013). In order to adapt to changing 
social interests, legislators’ relationships across public policy areas would benefit from 
being fluid. In this Oregon case study, I aimed to understand how legislators’ gender, 
party, and title affected the probability that they would co-vote with another legislator. 
The results indicate that females were significantly more likely to co-vote than males 
during the creation of the OEIB in 2011. In addition, Republicans were less likely to co-
vote than Democrats during the pre- and post-OEIB eras (2009, 2015, & 2017), 
suggesting that for a brief period the OEIB may have helped the legislature overcome 
party lines. These findings provide information about how female and Republican 
legislators in Oregon may have informed the policy formulation stage more during the 
centralized governance model than they would under the traditional governance model. 
More Research Needed to Understand the Bipartisan Voting Outcome 
Education governance networks can potentially drive the discourse for social 
change, removing power from dominant voices (Timm, 2014). This implies that in a 
Democratic state like Oregon, a networked governance approach might result in 
increased bipartisan voting. Unfortunately, the limitations of the dataset and the 
homogeneity among votes within the education realm did not provide enough variance 
among votes. Apart from party, the findings indicate that legislators were 99% likely to 
maintain ties with all other legislators during the pre- and post-OEIB eras (i.e. 2009-
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2011, 2013-2015, & 2015-2017). Due to this high rate of forming ties, there was 
generally not enough heterogeneity among the voting data to show evidence of increased 
bipartisan voting patterns. The same applies to the creation and implementation time 
interval from 2011-2013 when there was not enough variance for estimation. Although 
there were no conclusive estimates for parameters of bipartisanship, it is noteworthy that 
between the creation and implementation years the legislator networks were nearly 
complete. In this case, it seems that the governance practices established by the OEIB 
possibly catalyzed an internal change to the legislature, resulting in a nearly complete 
network during its implementation.  
Limitations 
 The current study has several limitations. First, the internal properties of legislator 
voting data on education-related bills provided little variance for the inferential statistical 
models to estimate parameters. This study attempted to model legislator voting data in a 
unique way by predicting endogenous relationships with an exogenous variable. In 
contrast, prior studies relied on more concrete co-sponsorship or communication data 
representing exogenous variables (e.g. Alvarez & Sinclair, 2011; Mousavi, 2016; Fowler 
et al., 2011). The legislator voting networks were nearly complete, ranging from 97.25 – 
99.95% of ties being actualized. While this extremely high density provided some insight 
into the structure of legislator voting networks, it also reveals that highly dense networks 
might be a characteristic of legislator voting networks on education-related bills, 
generally. The roll-call data from legislative sessions on education-related bills did not 
provide enough detailed information about legislators’ ideas to fully explain the 
education governance shifts related to their vote ties. Future research will benefit from 
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expanding the content of bills included in a study of legislator voting data to incorporate 
multiple substantive areas.  
 Second, using an exponential random graph model (ERGM) limited the estimable 
parameters based on the modeling specifications required to maintain unbiased estimates. 
In Cranmer et al’s. (2017) recent article there is a clear point that researchers must 
include at least one endogenous variable in an ERGM family model, or else the model 
becomes a logistic regression and estimates are inaccurate. For the very dense legislator 
networks under study, this resulted in the endogenous term edges, explaining all of the 
variance existing within the estimated networks. Therefore, the exogenous predictor of 
interest to this study, bipartisanship, was not significant and collinear with the edges 
term. In the end, what makes ERGM family model techniques so unique – their ability to 
model their own interdependence – becomes their most challenging feature. Future 
researchers interested in using legislator voting networks in the context of exogenous 
predictors will benefit from exploring how LAM or QAP provide more flexibility 
regarding model specifications and more intuitive estimates relating the theoretical 
hypotheses.  
 Third, the single-state case study design limits the generalizability of the findings. 
There is a trend growing across America for state education governance models to 
centralize their organizational structures. The current study was intentionally designed as 
a longitudinal study to understand the impact of the consolidated approach to structuring 
educational governance in one state over time. Therefore, the specific results cannot be 
applied broadly to other states functioning among a variety of other variables. However, 
the broader policy story told through the current longitudinal study provides information 
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for education policymakers about how a centralized approach to educational governance 
evolved in the Oregon policymaking context. In the future, researchers will benefit from 
applying a mixed-methods research design that triangulates more data sources (e.g. 
legislator interviews, transcripts from hearings, or media articles).  
 Finally, the existence of confounding variables may have mediated the 
relationship between legislator attributes and co-voting, as well as bipartisan voting. 
While the results indicate potential trends throughout Oregon legislator voting networks 
on education-related bills during 2011 and 2013 there were two notable factors that may 
have attributed to these shifts or lack of identifying further evidence, (a) the makeup of 
party affiliation across legislators and (b) the number of bills included in the final sample 
each year. These variables were included as part of the bill and legislator descriptive 
analyses but were not further explored as potential extraneous variables during the model 
building process. Since both the number of republican legislators and the number of bills 
included in each year of the study both varied along with the trends occurring in 
legislator networks they may be confounding variables.  
 In 2011 there was a substantial increase in the number of republicans in the 
Oregon house, by six legislators, and senate, by two legislators. In comparison to other 
years in the study, these increasing variables indicate that there may have been shifts 
occurring among Oregon politics and education bills generally that were not accounted 
for in this study. In addition, during that same year the network structure findings indicate 
that legislator networks were increasingly dense (i.e. more ties actualized), stronger (i.e. 
more weighted ties), cohesive (i.e. fewer subgroups), and distributed (i.e. fewer central 
legislators). The increase in republican representation in the Oregon legislature in 2011 
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may have been a catalyst for bipartisan voting in 2011, leading to increasingly dense, 
cohesive, and distributed networks. Since republican shifts were not included as an 
external variable and these trends align with the legislator voting networks it is likely that 
this is a confounding variable.  
 In addition, there were different numbers of bills included in both the pooled 
sample of bills, as well as the final sample of bills analyzed. In particular, there was an 
increase in the number of bills from 2009 to 2011, by 4, and again from 2011 to 2013, by 
five. The study results during those years also indicated that there was increasing degree, 
density, and little variance among data overall. It is possible that, since these changes in 
bill sample were not controlled and they align with the changing characteristic of the 
network structure, they were confounding variables. This is especially relevant since the 
increased number of bills may have increased the degree and density of the networks, as 
well as decreased the variance, resulting in the inestimable STERGM parameters. This 
confounding variable may have been controlled with further exploration of the nature of 
the increase in bills using a qualitative approach to study the bill topics during each year.  
Implications 
Despite the limitations presented, the current study implies that a governance 
network, like the OEIB, may relate to increased co-voting under a governor-led 
centralized model. In 2011, many states explored the role of governor-led education 
governance models (Zinth, 2011). States shifted their structures to pursue state goals that 
represented common social interests across stakeholders (Railey, 2017). For many states, 
this goal included a new approach to designing education systems and initiatives around 
birth-to-career education. However, with a consolidated model run by the governor, the 
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success of education policy formulation lies with the priorities of the governor’s office 
(Railey, 2017). The current investigation showed evidence about how Oregon’s SB 909 
(2011) departed from this model by enacting the OEIB with the charge of engaging in 
problem-solution discourse about social issues arising from various stakeholders 
(Cibulka, 2001).  
Today, seven years after the formation of the OEIB, states are pursuing new 
accountability models aligned with the Every Student Succeeds Act that incorporate more 
elaborate state goals (Railey, 2017). A recent report on education governance models 
published by the Education Commission of the States challenges states to determine the 
extent to which policymakers at the state and local levels hinder or reinforce student 
success and cohesive policy goals (Railey, 2017). Assuming that the current study results 
are true, states struggling to find coherence among their state goals will benefit from 
understanding that a networked approach to policy formulation, like the OEIB, might 
result in improved co-voting. In addition, this implies that a model like the OEIB might 
be applied to other sectors with similar partisan social interest like health, infrastructure, 
or the environment. Policy decisions must be intentional; whether centralized at the state 
level or distributed to districts, there is a balance between applying a fully centralized or 
decentralized model and setting coherent state goals that apply to embedded contexts like 
governance capacity and vision (Railey, 2017). 
In February 2018, Ohio Republicans introduced HB 512 (2018), similar to 
Oregon’s SB 909 (2011), which proposed to combine Ohio’s PK-12 department of 
education with their higher education and workforce development agency into a single 
unit, the Department of Learning and Achievement (DLA). If enacted, very similar to the 
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OEIB, the DLA will be headed by a governor-appointed director and assistant director for 
higher education and workforce transformation (Napp, 2018). Most importantly, this 
legislation transfers authority from the State Board of Education, State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, and Department of Education to the DLA. In addition, the Department 
of Higher Education and the Ohio Board of Regents, as well as the Chancellor of Higher 
Education roles will be abolished. Like the evolution of the legislative language in 
Oregon SB 909, current analyses of Ohio HB 512 explain that Republicans face 
challenges advancing this governance shift (Napp, 2018). For example, the state 
constitution provides there must be a State Board of Education and Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, so although under Ohio HB 512 these roles and institutions would 
remain, much of their power would be shifted to the DLA.  
Ohio is attempting to incorporate a large coordination institution remarkably 
similar to the OEIB in order to make elusive state goals a reality (Railey, 2017). Ohio and 
other states considering legislation that aims for this consolidation would benefit from 
understanding exactly how this exogenous shift of power might result in endogenous 
legislative changes, as well. For example, the current study found that during the years 
where this model was implemented legislators’ co-voting relationships were distributed 
broadly across all legislators. By creating common agreements that explicitly set simple 
and transparent education goals for the state and functional norms, the legislators might 
have achieved more coherence across common areas of public interest (Cibulka, 2001; 
Railey, 2017).  
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Future Research 
Applying social network analysis to governance and legislative processes is an 
emerging field. Researchers are still investigating optimal design and methodological 
choices that produce the most valid parameters for social networks. The current study 
reinforced existing recommendations for research in (a) social network analysis and (b) 
governance and legislative research.  
First, with regard to social network analyses, researchers interested in predicting 
variables exogenous to the networks would benefit from applying methods other than 
exponential random graph models like latent space models (LSM) and quadratic 
assignment procedures (QAP). These models allow researchers to test theoretical 
hypotheses about exogenous variables, where the structures of the dependencies 
endogenous to the network are not tested. Ultimately, which model is chosen depends on 
the theory and aims of the research, as well as the data properties (Cranmer et al., 2017).  
Second, with regard to governance and legislative research, the current study 
findings provide insights about what analyses and topics should be investigated next. The 
current study focused on the what and who components of Brewer and Smith’s (2008) 
education governance model by studying the governance model and legislator networks 
(e.g. goals & actors, respectively), but in order to fully understand the dynamic nature of 
the social network under study it is necessary to continue investigating the how. In other 
words, how did the policy formulation stage operationalize during the policy 
implementation stage and did the policies implemented achieve their desired ends? Such 
an investigation was not possible in the current study because data collection was 
retrospective, but efforts in Ohio and other states offer unique opportunities to add to our 
 74 
knowledge by collecting data prospectively. A study of this kind would provide further 
explanation for states about how education governance models provide accountability for 
the full cycle of policymaking at the state level.  
Third, future research may benefit from more robust research designs by applying 
mixed-methods approaches. Researchers applying social network analysis to governance 
and legislative networks can triangulate their findings by incorporating qualitative 
methods intentionally into the study design. For example, the current study could have 
benefited from a document analysis of the legislative hearings, popular press, or 
legislative analyses. In addition, interviews with legislators and members of the OEIB 
would provide valuable information about the potential relationships documented in the 
social network analysis. 
In sum, the current study suggests opportunities to better understand education 
governance models and networked approaches to policy formulation. This study 
documents evidence of the potential for politicians and policymakers, who are part of the 
education governance institutions, to relate to education policy formulation. While 
previous education governance research has documented shifts in education governance 
at the policy implementation level (Daly & Finnigan, 2011; Russell et al., 2015), the 
current study sought to investigate how shifts in education governance relate to policy 
formulation endogenous to the state legislature. Further, research on networked 
approaches to policy formulation may benefit from mixed-methods analyses that include 
qualitative approaches (e.g. document analysis or interviews) to supplement any kind of 
network analysis. However, the results of the current study provide insights into the 
complex social interactions underlying education policy formulation, like legislative 
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processes, even when considering the highly homogenous context of education- related 
votes. This study may help states considering such a consolidated governance structure 
understand how to guide coherence across legislators toward improved co-voting and 
policy formulation.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Social Network Analysis Glossary 
 
Term Technical Definition Study-specific Definition 
Arc Directed tie between two nodes in 
a network where the nodes are 
related by choice or nomination 
Line between two legislators that 
represents when their connection 
is explicitly stated (not studied in 
this investigation) 
Closeness 
centralization 
The number of nodes, other than 
the node of interest divided by the 
sum of all distances between the 
node and all others 
Indicator of the extent to which 
there are central legislators within 
the network 
Cohesion More ties within a network or 
subgroup denoting relational 
togetherness 
More connections between 
legislators within the network 
Degree Number of lines incident with a 
node 
Number of bills co-voted on with 
other legislators 
Density The number of ties expressed as a 
proportion of the maximum 
possible number of ties 
The proportion of actualized 
connections between legislators 
among a network out of the total 
possible connections 
Edge Tie between two nodes in a 
network that is undirected 
Line between two legislators that 
represent when they vote the 
same on a bill and their 
connection is implied 
Graph theory Modeling pairwise connections 
between nodes 
Analyses of actors and lines 
between pairs of actors 
Node Smallest unit in a network or 
graph (represents an actor or 
vertex) 
A legislator 
Social 
network 
analysis 
Methodology for conceptualizing, 
analyzing, and interpreting social 
networks 
Analyses that detect and interpret 
patterns of social ties 
Strength The sum of weighted ties for all 
nodes in a network 
The sum of legislators’ multiple 
ties with other legislators across 
the network 
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